Techno-Nationalism versus Interdependence: A Case Study of the Global Value Chain in the Semiconductor Industry

Document Type : Original research

Authors

1 The Department of Islamic Knowledge and Industrial Management, Faculty of Islamic Knowledge and Management, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran.

2 assistant professor technology studies instititue

3 Assistant Professor, University of Science and Technology

4 PhD student, University of Tehran, Faculty of World Studies, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

In today's world, the competition over advanced technologies—particularly in the semiconductor industry—has become a strategic arena for the exercise of state power. Given the capital-intensive nature of this industry and its critical role in national security and technological sovereignty, governments seek to dominate supply chains and associated technological capacities. This emerging trend has been described in recent research as “techno-nationalism.” The present study aims to examine the expansion of techno-nationalism at the level of strategic alliances within the semiconductor industry and the challenges arising from technological interdependence among partner nations. Using a document analysis approach and drawing upon credible sources on the interactions within global value chains (GVCs) in the semiconductor sector and their relation to the literature on techno-nationalism, this paper collects and analyzes relevant data. Through this process, all pertinent academic articles and studies concerning techno-nationalism in the semiconductor industry were systematically reviewed and analyzed. Accordingly, the paper explores the technological transition from the liberal international order, based on globalization of value chains, to an era of technological protectionism. It investigates in detail the intensifying trade war between the United States and China, including U.S. industrial policies, government interventions, and export control measures targeting advanced technologies—especially semiconductors and military artificial intelligence. It also examines China’s countermeasures, such as extensive support packages and national self-reliance policies. Within a realist analytical framework, this study interprets the rise of “reverse globalization” amid the decline of U.S. hegemony and the ascent of China, and employs the theory of value chain co-evolution to analyze the role of neutral states and multinational corporations in a multipolar technological competition. Ultimately, by assessing the major players in this landscape, the paper evaluates the feasibility of scaling techno-nationalist policies from the national to the global level, in the form of emerging technological blocs.

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References

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  • Receive Date: 22 June 2025
  • Revise Date: 23 September 2025
  • Accept Date: 27 September 2025

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